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Abstract  
This article examines the governance challenges facing Australian local government, which include 
lack of constitutional standing, intergovernmental dependencies, financial constraints and weak 
democratic standing. The historical context has shaped the nature and place of local government in 
the Australian federal polity and has contributed to the tensions created by an expansion of the roles 
and responsibilities of local government, especially in the provision of services, which is not matched 
by concomitant increases in financial capacity and local autonomy. These governance challenges are 
discussed with a view to establishing local government’s capacity for autonomous self-governance in 
the face of intergovernmental and fiscal dependencies, and the implications of this for local 
government reform trajectories. 
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Introduction 
The remit and responsibilities of Australian local government have expanded significantly since the 
1970s.  There is now increasing emphasis on local government as a vehicle for responsive local 
governance, as a sphere for local democracy and community strengthening in the face of cynicism and 
democratic deficit, and in the provision of an increasing number of important services.  However, the 
capacity of councils to fulfil these many new roles has not grown to a similar degree, and access to 
adequate finance and democratic safeguards are key concerns, creating a number of governance 
challenges.  Many of the difficulties facing Australian local government have been captured in 
numerous national and State inquiries, which include, but are not limited to the 2001 Commonwealth 
Grants Commission’s Review of the Operation of Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act 
1995; the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public 
Administration’s Rates and Taxes: A Fair Share for Responsible Local Government, commonly 
known as the Hawker Report (2003); the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA) 
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commissioned National Financial Sustainability Study of Local Government (PWC, 2006); and the 
Productivity Commission’s Assessing Local Government Revenue Raising Capacity (PC, 2008). The 
Henry Tax review also has significant implications for local government (Henry et al 2009; Passant & 
Mclaren, 2011). State-level inquiries have included the South Australian Local Government 
Association commissioned inquiry into the long-term financial sustainability of South Australian local 
government (FSRB, 2005a; 2005b); the Independent Inquiry in the Financial Sustainability of NSW 
Local Government (2006; Access Economics, 2006a); a Systemic Sustainability Study of Western 
Australian Local Government (Access Economics, 2006b; Craven et al, 2006; WLGA, 2008); a 
financial sustainability study commissioned by the Local Government of Tasmania (Access 
Economics, 2007); the Queensland Local Government Reform Commission’s series of reports on the 
Size, Shape and Sustainability of Local Government (QTC, 2008; DLGPS&R, 2007; LGAQ, 2005; 
LGAQ, 2006; LGRC, 2007); and the Municipal Association of Victoria’s series of reports on Trends 
in Local Government Finance (MAV, 2005; 2010). 
While the titles and foci of  these inquires may lead one to believe that financial sustainability is the 
central defining issue facing local government in the first decade of the 21
st
 century, functional, 
democratic and constitutional issues also provide governance challenges, many of which are rooted in 
the historical development of Australian local government. 
These governance challenges will now be discussed in turn, with a view to establishing local 
government’s capacity for autonomous self-governance in the face of intergovernmental and fiscal 
dependencies, and the implications of this for local government reform trajectories. 
Four challenges for local governance 
Australian local government differs from many of its OECD counterparts.  In the Australian federal 
system, local government fulfils only a limited number of functions and is often considered to be a 
‘lesser’ part of government.  This is due in part to historical factors, which have resulted in four 
governance challenges for local government:  
1. Intergovernmental dependencies and the changing roles and responsibilities of local 
government 
2. Financial constraints and dependencies  
3. Ideas about local government as a site of grassroots democracy and responsive 
governance versus expectations that it be an efficient vehicle for the delivery of many 
important services and act as an ‘executor’ of State government policies and 
programs 
4. Limitations on its sovereignty due to lack of constitutional recognition. 
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Challenge:  intergovernmental dependencies and changing LG roles  
The role of Australian local government and intergovernmental relations were established early in the 
twentieth century.  The importance of territory as an organising principle for governing was a central 
cause of the existence of local government, which was seen as an administrative adjunct to colonial 
regimes.  It acted as a mechanism to transfer to the community the administrative and financial burden 
for the provision of basic local services.  Consequently, it performed a narrow range of functions and 
there was a limited view of its role by the States and the Commonwealth.  This also led to local 
government having a restricted view of its own role and capacity to act as part of the federal system 
(Chapman, 1997, p. 1). 
Originally local government functioned as a ratepayer democracy (Zwart, 2003) concerned primarily 
to meet the needs and interests of landowners and ratepayers, rather than of all citizens.  Services to 
property were at the core of its responsibilities, with provision of roads being the most urgent.  The 
supply of water, electricity and transport was handled by specifically constituted State government 
bodies, as local authorities were not large enough, nor sufficiently resourced, to provide them 
(McNeil, 1997, p. 20).  Due to the fact that local government maintained the focus on services to 
property, in all states it ended up with a range of minor and essentially similar functions (Gibbins 
2001; McNeil, 1997, p.19).  The doctrine of ultra vires reinforced the limited power of local 
governments, as they could only do those things for which they had been given express legislative 
authority or which were reasonably incidental to the local government Acts (Aulich 1999, p. 14). 
Following the Second World War, local government functions broadened to include town planning 
and a range of welfare and leisure services (Bowman and Hampton, 1983, p. 169).  However, until the 
1970s, local councils were still largely considered to be responsible for only a restricted range of 
services with an emphasis on roads, rates and rubbish.  Local government was ‘not considered to be 
part of the governing system, but rather as a limited, functional managerial system’ (Chapman and 
Wood, 1984, p. 14). 
The Whitlam Labor government of 1972–75 heralded significant changes for local authorities, by 
considerably broadening the funding base and allowing councils diversity in the range of services they 
provided, expanding their sphere of action to encompass quality of life and wellbeing issues.  
Whitlam’s policies for local government can be grouped into broad structural development relating to 
its constitutional position, explicit financial initiatives and regionalisation.  Local government was 
granted attendance at the constitutional conventions of 1973–74.   
Broadening of councils’ financial base was another key policy.  The Whitlam government expanded 
the role of the Commonwealth Grants Commission to examine applications from local governments 
and provide to them with Section 96 Financial Assistance Grants.  General revenue assistance 
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recognised new demands were being placed on local government in areas such as health and welfare.  
This strategy was intended to use grants to encourage the nationwide development of regional 
authorities (Lloyd and Reid, 1974, p. 286; c.f. Chapman, 1997, p. 3).  In this way, the federal 
government used local government as a vehicle for the implementation of many policies the 
Commonwealth felt would have been blocked by States (Chapman, 1997, p. 1). 
The Grants Commission Act 1973 (Cth) allowed local governments to make applications for financial 
assistance through approved regional organisations of councils.  Regional Councils for Social 
Development were formed under the Australian Assistance Plan; Regional Organisations of Councils 
were intended to deal with the Grants Commission and were also used for the Area Improvement 
Program.  The financial assistance – $56 million in 1974–75 and $79 million in 1975–76 – was 
warmly received by local authorities, but both State and local spheres feared that this proposal was a 
threat and was a first step in the creation of regional government, which would cause their demise.  
However, as Miles (1976, p. 180) observed, ‘the regional organisation has, in relation to the Grants 
Commission, eventually served no purpose other than to act as a post office, or a convenient 
geographical location for hearing by the Commissions’ (c.f.  Chapman and Wood, 1984, p. 34), and 
little in the way of structural change eventuated.  Another initiative was the funding of local 
government projects such as area improvement grants, tourism and recreation, sheltered employment, 
home nursing, delivered meals, aged persons’ homes, childcare and preschools, regional employment 
development schemes and the Australian Assistance. 
The Whitlam initiatives showed local government for the first time that it had some political power, 
although Chapman (1997) concludes that it was not ready to become a genuine partner in government 
due to weaknesses with the out dated organisation and legislation in all States.   
After Whitlam’s dismissal in 1975, the Fraser Liberal/National government established the Advisory 
Council for Intergovernmental Relations and, by guaranteeing local government a share of personal 
income tax through the Local Government (Personal Income Tax Sharing) Act 1976 (Cth), councils 
were allocated a fixed proportion of Commonwealth personal income tax revenue.  Initially the 
percentage of these untied grants, known as PITs (personal income transfers), was set at 1.52%, rising 
to 1.75% in 1979–80 and to 2% in 1980–81.  In 1985–86 the Commonwealth ceased the tax sharing 
arrangement and introduced the Local Government Financial Assistance Act 1986 (Cth). 
The Fraser government institutionalised specific purpose grants which continued to direct the services 
provided by local governments to broaden beyond infrastructure to increasingly provide a range of 
social services (McNeil, 1997, p. 26–7).  This trend continues, and today, while the functions of local 
government still vary between the States and territories, they include: engineering; infrastructure and 
property services; recreation facilities; health services such as water and food inspection, 
immunisation services, toilet facilities, noise control, meat inspection and animal control; community 
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and cultural services; building services; planning and development approval; water and sewerage 
services (in Queensland, Tasmania and rural New South Wales); and environmental management and 
planning.  Local government is also an advocate and leader for the community, an agent for the 
delivery of services for other spheres of government, coordinator of services delivered at the local 
level, and an information broker (Commonwealth Grants Commission, 2001; ACLEG 2011). 
The work of the Advisory Council for Intergovernmental Relations helped bring local government 
into the intergovernmental processes.  Following from a recommendation by the 1973 constitutional 
convention, all States now recognise local government in their constitutions, though in various forms 
and with varying provisions.  However, this provides only limited protection and certainty, as the 
provisions can be changed easily by State Parliaments.  Consequently the State Constitutions provide 
only weak protection for the democratic status of local government (see also Hartwich 2009; 
Saunders, 2005).  Furthermore, none spell out clearly the functions and fiscal structure of local 
government, which has been left to ordinary acts of State Parliaments. 
Since the late 1980s there have been substantial reforms to the local government Acts in all States and 
the Northern Territory, with a move away from the doctrine of ultra vires.  Councils are now enabled 
to undertake the full range of activities necessary to fulfil the functions and powers delegated to them.  
The new Acts aim to improve accountability mechanisms, reduce the detailed prescriptions, and 
change council boundaries either by choice or by force of law, and change planning and other 
delegated powers.  However, all states and territories have retained overrule provisions in their local 
government legislation, and council can be merged, abolished or put under ‘administration’ by State 
governments, for example, in Victoria in the 1990s and in Queensland in 2008. 
The legislative changes provided the necessary framework for wider microeconomic reforms in local 
government to improve its performance orientation, accountability and relations with other spheres of 
government (Wensing 1997, p. 27).  Further reform focused on its governance role and sought to 
‘clarify the roles of State and local government, increase devolution and local capacity, mandate 
consultation and reporting as part of the strategic management process, and enhance provisions for 
referendums to ensure that councils are more accountable and responsive to the communities they 
serve’ (Aulich 1999, p. 13). 
The expansion of the role of local government has been partly due to devolution of functions by other 
spheres of government.  Other factors are market deregulation, industrial relations reform, 
privatisation of public utilities and competition policy.  Technological advancement and changing 
community expectations of government have also had a profound impact, with many councils 
expanding service provision in response to community demands.  Local government reform programs, 
implemented by some State governments, caused far-reaching changes to the structure and operations 
of councils.  A change of policy focus by local governments themselves has also contributed to their 
Brackertz                                                         Governance challenges in Australian LG 
 
CJLG May 2013 
8 
providing a wider range of services and taking a greater role in economic and social development and 
environmental management. The expansion in local government functions and range of services 
provided over recent decades, have led to a mismatch between expenditure demands and current 
levels of revenue, especially own-source revenues (ACELG 2011).  This is felt particularly strongly 
by rural and regional councils and in the areas of infrastructure maintenance. 
Challenge:  financial constraints and dependencies 
The perilous financial situation of Australian local government has been extensively discussed and 
has been the topic of numerous state and national inquiries (Access Economics, 2006a; 2006b; 2007; 
Commonwealth Grants Commission, 2001; Craven et al, 2006; Dollery, Crase and Byrnes, 2006; 
DLGPS&R, 2007; FSRB, 2005a; 2005b; Hawker Report, 2003; Independent Inquiry in the Financial 
Sustainability of NSW Local Government  2006; LGAQ, 2005; 2006; LGRC, 2007PC, 2008; MAV, 
2005; 2010; QTC, 2008; Tuckey, 2002; WALGA, 2008).  Local government remains hamstrung by 
its reliance on funding from State and federal governments, as the reforms of the 1970s and 1990s did 
little to address the narrowness of its revenue resources.  In his examination of federal-local 
relationships along the lines of constitutional recognition of local government, fiscal transfers between 
national and local governments, and intergovernmental relations between the two, Gibbins (2001) 
observes the Commonwealth’s monopolisation of income and consumption tax results in a vertical 
fiscal imbalance (c.f. Chapman and Wood, 1984, p. 35–6).  For example, since the abolition of PITs 
in 1985–86, local government’s only direct source of tax income is property rates, which makes up 
only 3-4% of the total national tax collected, and only one third of national property taxes, the other 
two thirds being an integral part of State governments’ revenue base (ALGA 2007). 
This means that State and local authorities depend on the federal government for the bulk of their 
operating budgets.  Gibbins (2001, p. 166) concludes that intergovernmental relations come hand in 
glove with fiscal entanglements, as they follow the fiscal rather than the constitutional channels.   
Australian local government revenue in 2003–04 amounted to $20.3 billion.  The main sources were: 
taxation/rates of 37.8% ($7.7 billion); fees and user charges 30.5% ($6.2 billion); grants, e.g. specific 
purpose payments from federal government such as Roads to Recovery and financial assistance grants 
which are paid to State governments for distribution to local government via the State Grants 
Commission, 12% ($2.4 billion).  Other income derives from investment interest, dividend interest: 
income from public enterprise, fines and the like, about 20% ($4 billion). 
In 2000–01 the Commonwealth Grants Commission undertook a review of the operation of the Local 
Government (Financial Assistance) Act 1995  which determines the amount of federal government 
grants to be paid.  A number of its findings gave rise to concerns that the mix of Commonwealth and 
State funding changed over time to the detriment of local government, while the services provided by 
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local government changed markedly, with an increased range of social welfare services at the expense 
of traditional property-based and infrastructure services.  This was interpreted by the Federal Minister 
for Regional Services, Territories and Local Government, Wilson Tuckey, as providing evidential 
support that the increased local government functions and responsibilities, which are largely devolved 
from the States, were not matched by an increase in funding or an appropriate access to additional 
revenue (Tuckey, 2002, p. 6). 
The Commonwealth Grants Commission (2001, p. 52–3) identified five main reasons contributing to 
the current financial crisis of local government.  Devolution refers to the transfer of responsibilities 
for new functions from higher spheres of government.  Raising the bar describes the requirement for 
increased complexity or standard at which local government services must be provided and an 
attendant increase in the cost of service provision.  Cost shifting occurs when a municipal council 
agrees to provide an essential service on behalf of another sphere of government but subsequently 
funding is reduced or stopped and local government has to continue to provide the service.  Cost 
shifting can also occur when another tier of government ceases to provide an essential service and 
local government is left to step into the breach.  Increased community expectations and demands have 
broadened the range of services provided by local government and have led to improvements in 
existing services.  Finally, individual councils’ policy choice has led them to expand or enhance their 
range of services. 
The Commission’s findings contributed to the establishment of a House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration inquiry into local government and cost 
shifting.  Its report, Rates and Taxes: A Fair Share for Responsible Local Government (the Hawker 
Report), ‘addressed not only the matter of cost shifting but also revealed the underlying issues relating 
to the governance arrangements between the three spheres of government’, estimating the impact of 
cost shifting at $550 million to $1.1 billion a year:  
There is no doubt that local government has, over a number of years, been on the wrong end 
of cost shifting largely by state governments.  Cost shifting can be seen as a symptom of the 
current weaknesses in our system and it is the responsibility of all spheres of government to 
address the matter (House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance 
and Public Administration 2003, vii). 
On 23 June 2005, the Commonwealth government formally responded to the report, highlighting four 
priority areas which resulted from its 18 recommendations (Commonwealth of Australia and 
Department of Transport and Regional Services, 2005).  It acknowledged that cost shifting and 
inadequacy of available financial resources were a significant problem, and accepted the 
recommendation to develop an intergovernmental agreement on these matters.   
The Commonwealth also accepted the recommendations for a Productivity Commission study on 
barriers to local government revenue, which resulted in the Assessing Local Government Revenue 
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Raising Capacity (2008) research report.  This found that most local government revenue consisted of 
own-source revenues (rates, fees, and charges) and grants from other spheres of government and 
noted that all councils could do more to increase their own source revenues, with most urban councils 
being in a position to self-fund current levels of expenditure.  However, the impact of this inquiry was 
limited, as the terms of reference excluded an assessment of the adequacy of Commonwealth financial 
assistance, focusing on local government own-source revenue and State government restrictions on 
these revenue sources.  The Commonwealth also agreed to a review of interstate distribution of the 
identified roads component of financial assistance grants.  Despite the formal acknowledgement of 
local government’s financial situation, no comprehensive program has been put in place to address 
these issues.  Vertical fiscal imbalances continue to limit local governments’ financial autonomy and 
they are not fully resourced to fulfil the many roles required of them.  
Challenge: local democracy and legitimacy 
The contemporary debate on the status of local government began in the 1970s, coinciding with the 
election of the Whitlam government and renewed debates around local government as a site of 
responsive governance, democratisation and empowerment.  In the 1980s a wave of public sector 
reform swept through all levels of the federal system, characterised by managerialism, marketisation 
and the new public management.  The cumulative effect was a strong emphasis on neoliberal 
economic and neoconservative political principles and a shift from government to governance.  
Discussion of local government’s role in democratic practice and as a vehicle for democratic 
legitimation gained renewed currency, especially in the context of neoliberal ideas about efficiency in 
service provision under network governance. 
Direct citizen participation in local democracy is often cited as a remedy for the weak democratic 
legitimacy and accountability deficits associated with network governance, outsourcing and 
marketisation (Mulgan, 2006; Considine, 2002; Klausen and Sweeting, 2005; Rhodes 1997).  Local 
engagement in the democratic sense is also seen as a measure to counteract the democratic deficit, 
providing a sphere for citizens to take direct action on issues that are important to them and 
contributing to the re-establishment of a sustainable community culture (Cox, 2000; Cuthill, 2003).  
Local government is seen to be ideally placed as the locus of direct citizen involvement because of its 
local knowledge and existing community ties and because it is closest to the people. As a 
consequence, it finds itself in the curious position of being singled out as the locus where the 
democratic deficiencies can be most effectively countered.  Perversely, the existence and democratic 
nature of local government is not effectively guaranteed because it is not entrenched in the federal 
Constitution and because State constitutions provide comparatively weaker provisions for its ongoing 
democratic existence.   
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Furthermore, while local government has a degree of legitimacy by virtue of being democratically 
elected, continued financial dependence on State governments means that, in the fiscal sense, it is not 
as accountable to its electorate as it is to the State governments (Hartwich, 2009, p. 7). 
In 2003, the Hawker Report recommended the recognition of local government by both houses of 
federal Parliament, which was acted upon in 2006.  A further amendment proposed by the Labor Party 
to include support for ‘a referendum to extend constitutional recognition to local government in 
recognition of the essential role it plays in the governance of Australia’ was rejected, indicating that 
while the Commonwealth Parliament recognised that local government has a legitimate place in the 
governance of Australia, there remained a degree of hesitation about ceding it too much power.   
Nevertheless, the motion contributed to the renewed momentum to recognise local government in the 
federal Constitution.  The status of local government in Australia’s federal structure is an important 
issue, especially when considered in the context the tensions between expectations that it should 
function as a legitimate source of responsive and democratic local governance versus its roles in 
efficiently providing services. 
Challenge: lack of constitutional standing 
Prior to federation in 1901, legislation to provide legitimacy and a framework for the operations of 
local government had been enacted by each of the colonies.  When the Australian Constitution was 
written, it did not include specific reference to local government.  Chapman and Wood (1984, p. 30) 
argue that it was left out and was not discussed at the constitutional conventions because it was not 
considered important enough.  Aulich and Pietsch (2002, p. 14) counter that this may be misleading as 
local government ‘does not appear to have been “excluded” in a deliberate sense – rather, there was 
little pressure for its inclusion’.  In any case, the lack of inclusion in the constitutional process meant 
that local government did not take part in federation, ‘a process in which the location of sovereignty 
and the distribution of powers and functions were at issue’ (Chapman and Wood, 1984, p. 30).  The 
consequences for local government autonomy and its status within the federal system were severe.  It 
became a State statutory authority by default and was denied a place in the new national polity 
(Aulich and Pietsch, 2002, p. 14).  State local government Acts were highly prescriptive of its roles, 
with councils seen as vehicles through which various statutory functions could be conducted and tasks 
delegated (Wensing, 1997, p. 26).  It has contributed to the low status and low perceived legitimacy of 
local government, which is often referred to as a ‘creature of the States’ and is regarded as the ‘third 
tier’ or ‘bottom tier’.  This has also resulted in each State developing its own distinctive style of local 
government with considerable variation between and within States, which makes it difficult to talk of 
an Australian local government system.   
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Following federation, the basic framework of Australian government remained remarkably stable 
until the 1970s when there was renewed discussion of local government’s constitutional standing, its 
financial position and a broadening of the services provided by it.  In Australia and internationally, 
ideas about local participation and democracy as a vehicle to empower local communities and 
facilitate responsive local governance were gaining new impetus. These ideas have not lost their 
currency, and indeed have gained credibility as a source of legitimacy for local decision making in the 
context of neoliberalism and the shift from government to governance. 
Constitutional entrenchment has been proposed as a measure to enhance the legitimacy and the 
financial security of local governments, by eliminating the role of the States as the middlemen, thus 
increasing revenue and providing a broader funding base and greater access to federal tax revenues, 
enshrining their autonomy, and protecting them from dismissal by State governments. 
Other perceived benefits are broader.  Greater direct association between councils and the federal 
government could bring some beneficial uniformity to the regulation of local government, which 
differs markedly from State to State (Dollery, Crase and Byrnes, 2006; Kane, 2006, p. 25).  
Constitutional recognition may also enhance local governments’ abilities to coordinate their resources 
in strategically important areas such as water and environmental management, although this is already 
happening in many instances (ACELG 2011). 
Achievement of these aims depends on the nature of the constitutional entrenchment sought, which 
could range from symbolic recognition to substantive constitutional protection, such as a guarantee of 
greater autonomy, clarity about tasks to be performed and access to sufficient revenue sources to 
undertake them. 
The history of the quest for constitutional recognition shows that there are significant obstacles to be 
overcome, many of which are rooted in tensions about the locus of power between local government, 
the States and the Commonwealth, fiscal dependencies, and the stringent requirements for a 
referendum which require a national majority of voters and a majority of electors in at least four out 
of six States. 
Section 128 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth), sets out the requirements 
for changes to the Constitution.  Any proposed laws must be passed by an absolute majority (the total 
number of representatives in the chamber) of both Houses of Parliament, before being submitted to a 
referendum.  If the two Houses disagree, the agreement of just one House is sufficient to initiate a 
referendum under the condition that a proposal has passed with an absolute majority and the other 
House ‘rejects or fails to pass it, or passes it with any amendment to which the first-mentioned House 
will not agree’. 
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Before proposals to amend the Constitution commence their passage through Parliament, they are 
generally preceded by debates in a range of formal (e.g. popular conventions, intergovernmental 
conventions such as the Australian Constitutional Convention, commissions, parliamentary 
committees, government, and interest groups) and informal fora (e.g. media, debates along party 
lines) (Williams and Hume, 2010). 
In 1973 the Whitlam government introduced the Constitutional Alteration (Local Government Bodies) 
Bill to allow the federal government to provide funding directly to local governments.  This was 
defeated in the Senate due to resistance from opposition parties who saw it as an affront to the States.  
Subsequently, a proposal to alter the Constitution to enable the Commonwealth to borrow money for, 
and grant financial assistance to, local government bodies rather than using States as conduits, was 
included in the referendum held on 18 May 1974 (Saunders, 2005).   
The campaign for a ‘no’ vote was underpinned by suspicions about the reasons why local government 
was seeking constitutional recognition, and by the Whitlam government’s agenda for regionalism.  In 
essence, opponents considered local governments’ constitutional aspirations as diminishing the power 
of the States and furthering centralist tendencies, and as a possible step towards establishing regional 
authorities (Kane, 2006, p. 26).   
Had the referendum been successful, the new constitutional provision would have provided a 
symbolic recognition of local government and would have opened up new funding avenues.  
However, it would not have provided substantial constitutional protection for local government as a 
democratically elected, integral part of the federal polity. 
The quest to increase the autonomy and standing of local government received new impetus at the 
constitutional referendum on 3 September 1988.  This proposed the addition of a section 119A to the 
Constitution: 
Each State shall provide for the establishment and continuance of a system of government, 
with local government bodies elected in accordance with the laws of the State and 
empowered to administer, and to make by-laws for, their respective areas in accordance 
with the laws of the State. 
The ‘no’ case argued that the term ‘system of local government’ was vague and open to interpretation 
and that the proposed provision would not provide protection from arbitrary dismissal and did not 
provide further clarity on the structure, role and basic rights and responsibilities of local government.  
The argument that the proposal was a step towards strengthening the power of the Commonwealth 
was revived with rather dramatic statement: 
This proposal changes nothing for Australians – except for the worse.  And again, it 
panders to the federal Government’s increasing desire for more power, centred in 
Canberra.  STOP CANBERRA’S POWER GRAB.  PROTECT YOUR SYSTEM OF 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT.  VOTE NO (Commonwealth of Australia, 1988, p 20).  
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The referendum was soundly defeated, with only 33.61% of votes in favour.  As in 1974, the negative 
outcome was the result of a sustained and successful campaign by opponents and a lack of bipartisan 
support.  Consequently the result was due largely to political factors rather than the nature of the 
amendments sought.   
This history of unsuccessful referendums is relevant today.  It indicates that bipartisan support and 
backing from the States is essential to achieving constitutional recognition of local government, a fact 
recognised in the Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Local Government’s Final Report 
(2011) which assessed the parameters of the current proposal for a third referendum on the issue.  
Importantly, the report identified that the underlying issues affecting the success of previous 
campaigns have not been resolved, as reflected in the States’ and Territories’ varying levels of support 
for and opposition to the four proposed types of amendments: symbolic recognition in a preamble to 
the Constitution, financial recognition, democratic recognition and federal cooperation. 
A key contention is about the impact of any proposed changes on the locus of power in the federal 
system, particularly the historic tension between local government as an instrument of national policy 
versus its function as a vehicle through which to implement activities and policies as seen fit by the 
State and territory governments – a tension which is closely tied to the financial entanglements 
described earlier.  A contributing factor and current pressing issue is the recent High Court finding in 
Pape v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1 which has cast doubt on the constitutional 
validity of the Commonwealth making direct grants to local government.  These factors and concerns 
about the financial sustainability of local governments, as outlined in the Hawker Report, contributed 
to the Expert Panel report indicating that a referendum around financial recognition was a preferred 
and potentially viable option for a referendum in 2013, as it has the highest level of support politically 
(at State and federal levels), is viewed favourably by 75% of the public (Expert Panel, 2011, p. 40) 
and is most likely to make a material difference to the financial situation of local government.  At the 
same time the Panel advised caution, noting ‘that financial recognition per se does not currently enjoy 
sufficient support either among stakeholders or the general community to give a referendum a high 
enough prospect of success in this Parliament’ (Expert Panel, 2011, p. 2).   
Democratic recognition – changing the Constitution to guarantee that local councils are elected bodies 
– is the second preference identified by the Expert Panel.  However, this option does not attract the 
same amount of political support.  Key stakeholders including the federal opposition and several State 
governments opposed this (Expert Panel, p. 8) on the basis that it would limit the States’ and 
Territories’ ability to supervise, oversee, manage and reform local councils, especially in the case of 
corrupt or dysfunctional councils.  The argument is that, under existing State Acts, local governments 
are already elected.  While democratic recognition would strengthen this provision, most States’ 
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submissions to the Expert Panel advanced the view that ‘there is nothing to be gained by including 
similar provisions in the Commonwealth Constitution’ (WA submission, Submission no 572, p. 2).   
Interestingly, the option of democratic recognition attracted the highest level of public support.  
Polling indicated that the people are sympathetic to a referendum on democratic recognition, possibly 
because this appeals to ‘a higher level concept than the institution of local government itself’ (Expert 
Panel, 2011, p. 8).  This may indicate that there is a popular desire for local government to become a 
recognised and safeguarded part of the democratic polity.  However, despite wide public support for 
the democratic option (85% supportive and 65% strongly supportive (Expert Panel, 2011, p. 40), 
previous referendums have shown that initial support for a referendum does not necessarily translate 
into a positive result, thus caution is advised.   
The two other options investigated by the Expert Panel – symbolic recognition and recognition 
through federal cooperation – were seen as unlikely to succeed.  While symbolic recognition, that is 
of the inclusion of local government in the Constitution in a way that has no real legal effect (possibly 
in a preamble), was the second most popular option in submissions (Expert Panel, 2011, p. 10), it 
received little support from stakeholders or in public consultation, largely because it was seen to have 
little practical effect and be largely tokenistic.  The final option, changing the Constitution to 
explicitly encourage cooperation between the governments of the federal system, was too new for 
most stakeholders and members of the Expert Panel to elicit much comment or debate and was seen to 
involve complex technical and legal matters regarding the federal balance of power. 
In summary, the submissions to and report of the Expert Panel indicate that many issues that worked 
against successful referendums in the past remain unresolved. It is not that the matters under 
consideration lack merit or support in principle, rather it is well established that political factors, 
uncertainty about the relative importance of the issues and conflicting views about the appropriate 
nature of constitutional entrenchment are ongoing challenges for the referendum process. 
Conclusion  
Although wide-ranging reforms have strengthened local governments’ roles and status since the 
1970s, their capacity to fulfil these expectations has not grown to the same degree.  In part this is due 
to constitutional issues, in part due to financial constraints and in part due to the historical evolution 
of local government in Australia, which has affected the way it sees itself and the way it is perceived 
by other spheres of government and the public.  In particular, there appears to be a persistent 
reluctance on the part of local government to take up its own cause and initiate change. This is 
evidenced, for example, by the fact that although local government peak bodies have initiated a 
number of inquiries, local government has been hesitant to put together and action packages of 
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reforms, leaving responses to the recommendations of inquires largely to state and federal 
governments. 
Access to finance and safeguard of democratically elected councils from arbitrary dismissal remain 
key concerns that need to be addressed.  Whether the constitutional route is the best way to deal with 
these issues is open to debate, as historically, structurally, legally and politically the chance of success 
of a referendum is slim. State and federal government opposition to democratic recognition in the 
Constitution demonstrates an ongoing scepticism about local government’s capacity to democratically 
and effectively administer and govern local affairs and a perception that it is in need of ongoing 
‘supervision’ by the States which must intervene if the situation becomes corrupt or dysfunctional 
(Expert Panel, 2011, p. 9).  At a deeper level it demonstrates that the States, territories and federal 
government are wedded to the idea of local government as a functional and administrative extension 
of their own policy agendas.  Thus, while there is much talk about local government as a site of 
authentic democratic governance and its attendant benefits (increased civic capacity, higher social 
capital, more effective and responsive provision of service), this is only supported as long as it suits 
the agendas set by State, territory and federal governments.  This makes it akin to an experiment in 
democracy that can be terminated if it does not suit the political agendas of the higher levels of 
government, as in Victoria in the 1990s. 
Alternatives to constitutional change include changes to State legislations to secure the autonomy of 
local government, coupled with initiatives and legislation to improve local governance and 
administrative reform. This would require concerted and coordinated action on behalf of local 
government and points to a further governance challenge, namely the need for local government to 
step up as a political actor in the federal system, advocating on its own behalf. 
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